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FEDERAL INCARCERATION BY CONTRACT IN A POST-
MINNECI WORLD: LEGISLATION TO EQUALIZE THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF PRISONERS
Allison L. Waks*
In the 2012 case Minneci v. Pollard, the United States Supreme Court held that
federal prisoners assigned to privately-run prisons may not bring actions for viola-
tions of their Eighth Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment and
may instead bring actions sounding only in state tort law. A consequence of this
decision is that the arbitrary assignment of some federal prisoners to privately-run
prisons deprives them of an equal opportunity to vindicate this federal constitu-
tional right and pursue a federal remedy. Yet all federal prisoners should be entitled
to the same protection under the United States Constitution-regardless of the type
of prison to which they are assigned. This Note discusses the national trend toward
prison privatization and the current asymmetry in legal protections and remedies
available to prisoners depending on whether they are assigned to federally-run or
privately-run prisons. It concludes by proposing federal legislation that would pro-
vide uniformity in the protection of federal prisoners against cruel and unusual
punishment.
INTRODUCTION
Contracting out governmental functions in the United States is
not a new phenomenon. For decades, the federal and state govern-
ments have contracted with private companies to outsource public
services that private companies are capable of providing more cost-
effectively.' In recent years, however, outsourcing has grown to in-
clude services that many consider to be "traditional governmental
functions."2 Outsourcing now pervades the provision of core gov-
ernmental functions, such as the conduct of military operations,
the management of public schools, and the administration of wel-
fare and public benefits.3 This ubiquitous expansion of government
* J.D. Candidate, May 2013, University of Michigan Law School. B.S., 2008, Cornell
University. I would like to thank Professor Christina Whitman for her thoughtful comments
and support, as well as my editors Benjamin Able,John Patrick Clayton, Nani Gilkerson, Beth
Kurtz, Katie Poulos, and Nina Ruvinsky.
1. See generally KEVIN R. KOsAR, CONG. RESFARCH SERV., RL 33777, PRIVATIZATION AND
THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: AN INTRODUCTION (2006).
2. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 passim (1985) (describ-
ing the concept of "traditional governmental functions").
3. See, e.g., Richard Frankel, Regulating Privatized Government Through § 1983, 76 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1449, 1450-52 (2009); see also Laura Dickinson, Government for Hire: Privatizing Foreign
Affairs and the Problem of Accountability Under International Law, 47 WM. & MARY L. REv. 135,
137-38 (2005) (discussing the privatization of military operations).
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outsourcing has raised serious concerns about the accountability
and transparency of the government to its citizens.
4
The proliferation of government outsourcing has been driven, in
part, by increased demand for services that the government simply
lacks the resources to provide. Recent budget crises have height-
ened the government's pressure to outsource, 5 as have political
movements vying to reign in "big government" by reducing public
sector functions and services in favor of the private sector. This
Note focuses on one area of government outsourcing that has par-
ticularly troubling consequences: the outsourcing of prison
management to private, for-profit entities. 6 The privatization of
prisons has stripped certain federal prisoners of the ability to seek
redress for violations of their constitutional protection against cruel
and unusual punishment. In light of the Supreme Court's 2012 de-
cision in Minneci v. Pollard,7 prisoners housed in privately-run
prisons are barred from bringing suit for violations of their consti-
tutional rights under the Eighth Amendment simply because their
jailors happen to be employed by a private company and are thus
not considered government actors who can be held legally account-
able for Eighth Amendment violations. This Note addresses the
legal predicament of federal prisoners who have the misfortune of
being assigned to a private prison, and argues for federal legislation
that would provide the same rights and protections to all federal
prisoners.
At the state level, by contrast, public and private prisoners have
superior federal rights through remedies afforded by § 1983 of the
Civil Rights Act of 1971,8 which provides a private right of action for
4. As used in this Note, government outsourcing, or privatization, means the provision
of services or functions that were at one time handled by the government but are now pro-
vided or managed by private, commonly for-profit, entities that contract with the
government. SeeJody Freeman & Martha Minow, Introduction: Reftaming the OutsourcingDebates
in GOVERNMENT By CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 3 (Jody Freeman &
Martha Minow eds., 2009).
5. See, e.g., D. M. Levine, What's Costlier than a Government Run Prison? A Private One,
CNN MONEY (Aug. 18, 2010, 12:17 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2010/O8/17/news/
economy/private-prisons-economic-impact.fortune/index.htm ("In recent years, the trend
toward privatization, both among state governments and at the federal level has been part of
an attempt to address serious budget troubles .... .").
6. The relevant federal agencies are the Department of Justice's Bureau of Prisons
(BOP), the United States Marshals Service (USMS), and the Department of Homeland Se-
curity's Bureau of Immigration and Custom Enforcement (ICE). The private, for-profit
entities are, most commonly, the GEO Group, Inc. and Corrections Corporation of America.
See infra Part IA.
7. 132 S. Ct. 617 (2012).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) ("Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State.. . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
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constitutional violations committed by state actors.9 The closest fed-
eral law analog, the Bivens action' 0-an implied cause of action for
a constitutional violation committed by a federal actor in absence
of a statutory remedy-is an inferior cause of action because the
Supreme Court has not extended it to include actions brought by
private prisoners against privately-run prisons and their employ-
ees.11 This federal-state asymmetry is the reason that this Note
focuses on the federal system. The proposed reform would impose
liability on the federal government that would more closely parallel
the state governments' responsibilities toward their prisoners in
both public and private prisons.
Part I explores the current status of the privately-run prison sys-
tem and reviews the legal landscape of prisoners' rights in both
public and private prisons at the federal and state levels. Part II
explains the problem of asymmetry in the remedies available to fed-
eral prisoners in public and private prisons by comparison to those
available to state prisoners. Part III proposes legal reform to address
these deficiencies. Part IV dispels alternative approaches. Part V dis-
cusses the implications of the proposed reform.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF PRIVATE PRISONS
AND THE CURRENT LEGAL LANDSCAPE
A. The Special Case of Private Enterprise in the Prison System
The vast increase in the federal prisoner population has resulted
in a demand for correctional facilities that has been difficult for the
federal government to meet. Consequently, the government has
turned to private companies to build and operate prisons to house
the growing population of federal inmates.
rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured.").
9. See Alvarez v. Geo Group, Inc., No. SA-09-CV-0299 OG (NN), 2010 WL 743752, at *5
(W.D. Tex. Mar. 1, 2010) (holding that a state prisoner in a county jail operated by the GEO
Group had a viable § 1983 claim for a constitutional injury); infra Part I.C.2.
10. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971).
11. See infra Part I.C.1 (discussing the Bivens remedy and its preclusion for privately-held
federal prisoners).
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Beginning in the 1970s, the government's "war on drugs"12 and
war on crime have resulted in thousands of additional federal con-
victions and imprisonments.' 3 Today, those convicted of weapons
and drug crimes comprise a major portion of all federal prisoners.
For example, in 2010, 51 percent of federal inmates were drug of-
fenders, 14 compared with just 30 percent in 1984.15 At the same
time, congressional reform of the federal sentencing regime has
caused judges to impose harsher sentences. The Sentencing Re-
form Act of 1984,16 which was intended to provide for greater
consistency and procedural fairness to federal sentences, in fact led
to longer sentences through imposition of mandatory minimums
that exceeded the sentences that many federal judges had previ-
ously imposed.' 7 Similarly, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 198618
created mandatory minimum sentences for drug crimes that ham-
strung judges from showing leniency toward defendants by
departing from the suggested statutory sentence. Additionally, the
government's "war on terror" 9 led to a significant increase in the
federal inmate population as thousands of illegal immigrants were
arrested and jailed by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE). From 1996 to 2009, the number of ICE prisoners more than
tripled, and in 2009 alone, over 383,000 immigrants were detained
by ICE, costing taxpayers $1.7 billion.
20
12. President Richard Nixon coined the term "war on drugs" in a speech in 1971. See
Timeline: America's War on Drugs, NPR (Apr. 2, 2007, 5:56 PM), http://www.npr.org/
templates/story/story.php?storyld=9252490
13. See Matthew W. Tikonoff, Note, A Final Frontier In Prisoner Litigation: Does Bivens Ex-
tend to Employees of Private Prisons Who Violate the Constitution?, 40 SUFFeOLK U. L. REv. 981, 983
(2011).
14. PAUL GUERINO, PAIGE M. HARRISON & WILLIAM J. SABOL, BUREAU OF JUsTICE STATIS-
TICS, PRISONERS IN 2010 1 (2011), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/plO.pdf
[hereinafter PRISONERS IN 2010].
15. Tikonoff, supra note 13, at 986 (citing Judith Greene, Bailing-Out Private Jails, in
PRISON NATION: THE WAREHOUSING OF AMERICA'S POOR 142 (Tara Herivel & Paul Wright eds.,
2003)).
16. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98473, 98 Star. 1987 (1984) (codified as
amended at scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C. (1988)).
17. Portraying the view that sentences were not adequate to address the severity of cer-
tain crimes, the Sentencing Commission added in § 994(h) of the Sentencing Reform Act
that, among its duties, "[t]he Commission shall assure that the guidelines specify a sentence
to a term of imprisonment at or near the maximum term authorized." 28 U.S.C.
§ 994(h) (2006) (emphasis added); see also generally Michael Tonry, The Functions of Sentencing
and Sentencing Reform, 58 STAN. L. REv. 37 (2005).
18. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986).
19. President George W. Bush coined the term "war on terror" after the September 11,
2001 attacks. See President George W. Bush, Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on
the United States Response to the Terrorist Attacks of September 11 (Sept. 20, 2001).
20. See DETENTION WATCH NETWORK, The Influence of the Private Prison Industry in Immigra-




Today, the United States has the highest incarceration rate in the
world: over 2.2 million adults-nearly one in every one hundred
adults-are behind bars.2 1 By proportion, the U.S. prison popula-
tion far surpasses that of any other developed country-the United
States makes up 5 percent of the world's population, but incarcer-
ates 25 percent of the world's prisoners. 22 This is partly due to the
fact that the American criminal justice system incarcerates offend-
ers for a wide variety of crimes, some of which are nonviolent. In
most Westernized nations, by contrast, such nonviolent crimes are
unlikely to result in imprisonment, and, when they do, prison
sentences are for far shorter periods of time.
23
The modern system of incarceration in the United States has cre-
ated a massive prison population that has fueled a $3 billion private
sector prison industry. According to the Department of Justice
(DOJ), between 2000 and 2009, the number of federal prisoners in
private prisons more than doubled from 15,524 to 34,087.24 In
2009, 16.4 percent of federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) prisoners
were housed in private facilities. 25 This was ten times higher than
the number in 1990.26 Further, the number of ICE detainees held
in private prison facilities increased by 263 percent from 1995 to
2005.27 The two principal prison contractors are the GEO Group,
21. See LAUREN E. GLAZE, BUmEAU OF JUsTICE STATISTICS, CORRECTIONAL POPULATION
IN THE UNITED STATES, 2010 3 tbl.1 (2011), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/
pub/pdf/cpusl.pdf; THE PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, ONE IN 100: BEHIND BARS IN AMERICA
2008, available at http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/
sentencingand_corrections/one in_100.pdf.
22. Doris MacKenzie & Douglas Weiss, Other Countries Have Successfully Reduced Incarcera-
tion Rates Without Increasing Crime: We Can Do It!, 4 VicTiMs & OFFENDERS 420, 420 (2009).
23. See Adam Liptak, Inmate Count in U.S. Dwarfs Other Nations, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2008,
at Al; see also Rough Justice: America Locks Up Too Many People, Some for Acts that Should Not Even
Be Criminal ECONOMIST.COM (Jul. 24, 2010), http://www.economist.com/node/16640389?
Story_ID=16640389 (discussing a shocking case of three Americans who were each sentenced
to eight years in prison for importing lobster tails in plastic bags rather than in cardboard
boxes, in violation of the Lacey Act). For an interesting article on the deterioration of the
American criminal justice system, see James Q. Whitman, What happened to Tocqueville's
America?, 74 Soc. RES. 251 (2007).
24. See HEATHER C. WEST, WILLIAM J. SABOL & SARAH J. GREENMAN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 2009 app. tbl.20 (2010), available at bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/
pdf/p09.pdf [hereinafter PRISONERS IN 2009].
25. Id. This statistic does not include the federal prisoners held by other federal agen-
cies that also contract with private facilities, such as ICE and USMS.
26. John R. Emshwiller & Gary Fields, Court Weighs Private Inmates' Rights, WALL. ST. J.,
Oct. 31, 2011, at A.4 ("More than 26,000 federal prisoners are housed in private prisons, ten
times the level of 1990.).
27. Tikonoff, supra note 13, at 987 (citing PAIGE M. HARmSON & ALLEN J. BECK, BUREAU
oFJusTncE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 2005 (2006), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/
pub/pdf/p05.pdf.
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Inc. and Corrections Corporation of America (CCA).28 CCA was the
first to break into the business in 1983,29 and the GEO Group (then
Wackenhut Corrections Corporation) entered shortly thereafter.3
These two corporations now dominate the private prison market in
the United States.
31
B. Concerns with Outsourcing Prison Management
That the personal safety of inmates is at the mercy of their jailors
is proposition that is magnified when viewed through the prism of
privatization. As the Legal Aid Society has remarked as amicus:
"There are few exercises of government authority more potent than
incarceration. In the prison, government power is at its zenith, as
the prisoner is entirely dependent upon his jailers to provide for his
wellbeing and ensure his survival."3 2 A fundamental concern with
prison privatization is that the absence of direct government con-
trol over incarceration is incompatible with American democratic
values of transparent governance and poses a greater threat to the
safety of those who are incarcerated. 33
The notion that the care of those incarcerated is a responsibility
of government relates back to the birth of our Nation. In The Feder-
alist No. 84, Alexander Hamilton noted that the " 'confinement of
the person, by secretly hurrying him to jail, where his sufferings are
unknown or forgotten, is a less public, a less striking, and therefore
a more dangerous engine of arbitrary government.' ',34 Hamilton
was emphasizing due process rights from arrest to sentencing, but
these concerns arejust as important once the defendant is serving a
prison sentence. The government must be accountable for the
28. SeeJusncs PoiicV INSTITUTE, GAMING THE SYSTEM: How THE POLITICAL STRATEGIES OF
PRIVATE PRISON COMPANIES PROMOTE INEFFECTrIVE INCARCERATION POLICIES 6-7 (2011), availa-
ble at http://www.justicepolicy.org/uploads/usticepolicy/documents/gaming-thesystem.
pdf.
29. Id. at 6.
30. Id. at 7.
31. Id. at 8. As of 2010, CCA operated sixty-six prison facilities under contract with the
BOP, ICE and USMS at the federal level, and nineteen states and the District of Columbia;
GEO operated 118 prison facilities under contract with all three federal detention agencies
as well as thirteen states. Id. at 6-8.
32. Brief for The Legal Aid Society of the City of New York as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondent, Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61 (2001) (No. 00-860), 2001 WL 826705
at *3.
33. See, e.g., Sharon Dolovich, State Punishment and Private Prisons, 55 DUKE L.J. 437
(2005).
34. THE FEDERAIST No. 84, at 474 (Alexander Hamilton) (The Colonial Press ed., 1901)
(quoting 1 Wnui BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARLES *136).
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safety and wellbeing of those whom it incarcerates, especially be-
cause the conditions of confinement are removed from the public
eye.
The current increase in prison privatization harkens back to this
"less public" system of incarceration that was of concern to Hamil-
ton.35 Today, government entities-including the BOP, ICE and
USMS-are bound by the Freedom of Information Act, the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act, and other "government in the sunshine
laws." 36 Unlike the government, however, private contractors do not
have any such legal obligations to be transparent. 37 As such, they
are exempt from public disclosure requirements that would require
the government to publish or disclose detailed information on its
operations and care for prisoners.38 In 2011, a bill that would have
required private prison entities to make available to the public the
same information that federal prison facilities are required to make
died in Congress before reaching subcommittee hearings.39 This
was due, in part, to the strong lobbying efforts of CCA in opposition
to this and similar bills.40 Additionally, some private facilities dis-
perse prisoners widely across several states,4' creating further
obstacles to the already challenging task of applying governmental
regulations and oversight to private prison operations, due to vari-
ances in state laws and the difficulty in tracking and compiling data.
With accountability and transparency thus diminished, private
prison corporations, like any for-profit entity, are able to focus on
reducing costs and increasing profits. Their business models feed
on increasing bed capacity and cutting costs. To encourage the gov-
ernment to sign a contract, these companies must show that they
can operate prisons at a lower cost than the government.42 Cheaper
35. Some level of prison privatization, however, can be traced back to colonial America.
See Dolovich, supra note 33, at 450-54.
36. See id.
37. See Freeman & Minow, supra note 4, at 3 ("[1In some cases, legal regulations and
sanctions simply do not apply to contractors.").
38. See Brief for the American Civil Liberties Union, The Legal Aid Society of New York,
and the Washington Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights and Urban Affairs as Arnici Curiae
Supporting Respondent, Minneci v. Pollard, 132 S. Ct. 617 (2012) (No. 10-1104), 2011 WL
4352227, at *9-10; cf 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A) (2006).
39. Private Prison Information Act of 2011, H.R. 74, 112th Cong (2011).
40. CCA registered to lobby against this bill. See opensecrets.org (last visited Mar. 4,
2013) (accessed by searching by "Bills" for H.R. 74).
41. See CODY MASON, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, Too GOOD TO BE TRUE: PRIvATE PRIsoNs
IN AMERICA (Jan. 2012), available at http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/inc_
Too_Good to_be_True.pdf.
42. See Dolovich, supra note 33, at 459-60. However, it is not empirically clear that pri-
vate prisons save money; studies produce varying results. In 1996, the U.S. General
Accounting Office (GAO) looked into four studies funded by the state and federal govern-
ments and determined that the methodologies and results varied across each of the studies,
SPI'NG 2013] 1071
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operations inevitably mean that costly quality standards and safety
procedures take a backseat, setting the stage for prison conditions
in which violations of constitutional rights go unaddressed. Moreo-
ver, these for-profit companies actively lobby for stricter
immigration and drug laws and harsher federal sentences. 43 In its
2010 Annual Report, for example, CCA acknowledged that societal
efforts to reduce crime rates and other legislation to reduce
sentences and allow for early release of inmates based on good be-
havior are inherent "risk factors" to its business model,44 effectively
stating that business is better when crime is higher.
What does this mean for the inmates housed in private prisons?
The cost-cutting focus of private corporations translates to reduced
staffing levels, 45 reduced investment in training of prison guards,4
6
increased ratios of inmates to correctional officers,47 and lower
wages for private correctional officers. 48 Low pay, poor training,
and high turnover may contribute to higher levels of violence in the
private sector prisons. 49 This may in turn encourage private prison
employees to violate prisoners' rights-rights that would be better
with two showing no major difference in efficiency between private and public prisons, an-
other study showing that private prisons resulted in only 7 percent savings to the state, and
another study finding that the cost of a private facility fell somewhere between the cost of two
similar public prisons. See MASON, supra note 41, at 7.
43. See CoRRt cONS CORPORATION OF AMEmCA, 2010 ANNUAL REPORT ON Fosm 10-K
[hereinafter CCA 2010 ANNUAL REPORT], available at http://phx.corporate-ir.net/External.
File?item=UGFyZW50SUQ9NDE5MTEwfENoaWxkSUQ9NDMyMjglfFR5cGU9MQ==&t=1
(discussing lobbying efforts for strict drug laws and harsher sentences); DETENTION WATCH
NETWORK, The Influences of Private Prison Industry in Immigration Detention, http://www.
detentionwatchnetwork.org/privateprisons (last visited Sept. 20, 2012) (discussing lobbying
efforts for harsher immigration laws).
44. See CCA 2010 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 43, at 19-20 ("The demand for our facili-
ties and services could be adversely affected by the relaxation of enforcement efforts,
leniency in conviction or parole standards and sentencing practices or through the
decriminalization of certain activities that are currently proscribed by our criminal laws.").
45. SeeJAMEs AUSTIN & GARY COVENTRY, BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSIANCE, EMERGING ISSUES
ON PRIVATIZED PRISONS 52 (2001) ("[T]he number of staff assigned to private facilities is
approximately 15 percent lower than the number of staff assigned to public facilities.").
46. See Curtis R. Blakely & Vic W. Bumphus, Private and Public Sector Prisons-A Compari-
son of Select Characteristics, 68 FED. PROBATION 27, 29 (2004). Based on data obtained in 1998,
the public sector required 232 hours of "pre-service training" whereas the private sector only
required 174 hours. Id.
47. lId In 1998, the inmate to correctional officer ratio for the private sector was 6.7:1,
whereas it was 5.6:1 in the public sector. Id.
48. Id. In 1998, private prison corporations paid prison officials between $15,919 and
$19,103 while the BOP paid prison officials between $21,246 and $34,004 for comparable
work. Id.
49. Id. at 30. The average correctional officer turnover rate is three times higher in the
private sector (43 percent) than in the public sector (15 percent). Id. at 29.
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safeguarded if the prisoners were guarded by government employ-
ees in government-run facilities. This is the predicament of the
privately-housed federal prisoner.
One notorious example of the dangers of prison privatization
comes from CCA's management of a federal prison facility in
Youngstown, Ohio, beginning in 1997. An independent report un-
covered that within the first fourteen months of operation, the
prison "experienced pivotal failures in its security and operational
management." 50 In a speedy effort to increase occupancy and boost
profits, CCA had neglected to properly screen incoming prisoners
and instead classified maximum-security inmates as medium-secur-
ity to fill its beds.51 Consequently, CCA prison guards were unable
to control their prisoners. What followed is eye-opening:
CCA managers employed brutal policies[,] ... engaged in ex-
cessive use of force against prisoners, failed to maintain
control over weapons, and failed to implement numerous se-
curity procedures. As a result, there were two homicides,
numerous stabbings, extreme levels of violence, and six es-
capes within the first 14 months.5
2
Despite these egregious breaches of security, CCA neglected to con-
duct an internal investigation until the federal government
required it to do so,5 strongly suggesting that this private prison
contractor was largely unconcerned with the safety and security of
its prisoners and was instead motivated by increased profits. Cer-
tainly in this case, privatization resulted in lax enforcement in safety
standards and concern for prisoners' wellbeing.
Although prisoners may not be sympathetic victims, it is impor-
tant to appreciate that abuse in private prisons is common and can
50. JOHN L. CLARK, INSPECtION AND REVIEW OF THE NORTHEAST OHIO CORRECTIONAL
CENrER (1998) [hereinafter YOUNGSTOWN REPORT], available at http://www.justice.gov/ag/
youngstown/youngstown.htm. This was an independent report by the Corrections Trustee
for the District of Columbia appointed by Attorney General Janet Reno at the request of
Ohio Governor George V. Voinovich and the U.S. Congress.
51. See id.; see also Dolovich, supra note 33, at 461.
52. Brief for The Legal Aid Society of the City of New York as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondent, Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61 (2001) (No. 00-860), 2001 WL
826705, at *13 (citing YOUNGSTOWN REPORT, supra note 50, at 5). In another terrifying exam-
ple, correctional officers at a private state jail in Texas who "had only forty hours of classroom
training, were videotaped 'forcing prisoners to crawl, kicking them, and encouraging dogs to
bite them.' " Tikonoff, supra note 13, at 989 (citing Editorial, Prison Privatization is No Pan-
acea, HARTFORD CouRAirr, Aug. 24, 1997, at C2).
53. Brief for The Legal Aid Society of the City of New York as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondent, Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61 (2001) (No. 00-860), 2001 WL
826705, at *13.
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be quite egregious, as evidenced by the preceding CCA example.
Such abuse takes a number of troubling forms. For example, fe-
males housed in private prisons have been raped by guards;
54
prison guards have physically abused prisoners for failing to follow
orders, or for no reason at all;55 and prisoners have preyed upon
other prisoners while guards looked the other way or failed to inter-
vene. 56 Although in some cases these prison guards have grossly
abused their individual power and acted well beyond the outer lim-
its of their authority, the more troubling reality is that in many
situations the abuse of prisoners may stem from the cost-contain-
ment policies put in place by the private corporations that operate
these prisons, resulting in intentional violations of prisoners' rights.
Considering that those behind bars already have limited rights, pro-
tecting the few rights that they do have is all the more essential. As
Justice White declared, "though his rights may be diminished by the
needs and exigencies of the institutional environment, a prisoner is
not wholly stripped of constitutional protections when he is impris-
oned for crime. There is no iron curtain drawn between the
Constitution and the prisons of this country. '57 Ultimately, the type
of prison in which a federal prisoner is incarcerated should not af-
fect his ability to protect and defend his fundamental rights.
C. The Current Legal Landscape
Under the current framework, the type of federal prison to
which a prisoner is assigned determines the level of federal protec-
tions available to that prisoner. An appreciation of the rights that
may be abridged by the happenstance of being incarcerated in a
privately-run prison first requires an understanding of the legal
remedies currently available to publicly-held federal prisoners.
54. See, e.g., Amended Complaint, Doe v. Neveleff, No. 11-cv-907, 2011 WL 7783507
(W.D. Tex. Dec. 5, 2011) (seeking damages for former inmates sexually assaulted while in
ICE custody at a prison operated by CCA).
55. YOUNGSrOWN REPORT, supra note 50 (inmates abused by CCA prison guards).
56. Wackenhut Corr. Corp. v. de la Rosa, 305 S.W.3d 594, 600 (Tex. App. 2009) (alleg-
ing that an inmate was beaten to death by two other inmates while Wackenhut prison guards
just stood by and watched). For a compilation of prisoner abuse cases against CCA, see Pro-
ject On Government Oversight (POGO), Federal Contractor Misconduct Database, http://www.
contractormisconduct.org/index.cfm/1,73,221,htrnl?ContractorlD=170 (last visited Nov. 26,
2012).
57. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974).
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1. Bivens Actions for Publicly-Held Federal Prisoners
In Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents,58 federal agents
acting under the color of federal law, unlawfully entered and
searched Webster Bivens's apartment in search of drugs. At the
time, there was no legal remedy through which Bivens could seek
monetary compensation for the officers' actions.59 The Supreme
Court thus created an implied cause of action for a constitutional
violation committed by a federal actor in the absence of an existing
statutory remedy, in that case applying the action to a Fourth
Amendment violation of unreasonable search and seizure. In doing
so, the Court created a federal analog to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which
allows individuals to bring suit for constitutional violations commit-
ted by state and local government actors. 6°
Almost a decade later, in Carlson v. Green,61 the Supreme Court
extended Bivens to include Eighth Amendment violations, thereby
explicitly providing prisoners with a federal cause of action by
which to remedy cruel and unusual punishment. Since then, the
Bivens action has been the foundation of numerous federal pris-
oner claims of constitutional violations committed at the hands of
government officials in federally-run correctional facilities.
2. The Incarceration of Federal Prisoners Must be Regarded
as "Federal Action" to Fall Under Bivens
Only government actors can be held responsible for constitu-
tional violations. Thus, prison guards employed by private
corporations operating prison facilities under contract with a fed-
eral agencym-such as the BOP, ICE, or USMS-cannot be sued for
alleged constitutional violations unless they are considered to be
standing in the shoes of federal officials and "acting under the
58. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
59. See id. at 394. Bivens, acting pro se, brought a civil suit for damages against the
federal agents, alleging that his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable
search and seizure was violated. The Second Circuit, affirming the district court, held that
"the Fourth Amendment does not provide a basis for a federal cause of action for damages
arising out of an unreasonable search and seizure." Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics
Agents, 409 F.2d 718 (2d Cir. 1969). Further, because Bivens consented to the federal agents
entering his home, any state tort law claim for trespass was precluded. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 394.
60. The Court noted, however, that the Bivens action may be defeated in light of "special
factors counseling hesitation," including the presence of alternative remedies. Id. at 396; see
also infra Part III.A.
61. 446 U.S. 14 (1980).
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color of federal law."62 It would only seem reasonable for the gov-
ernment to be accountable to those it incarcerates, wherever and
however it incarcerates them, whether under the control of public
or private prison officials. Thus, as a predicate issue, it is necessary
to determine that private federal prison contractors are govern-
ment actors if we are to prevent the federal government from
escaping responsibility for the constitutional rights and wellbeing of
its prisoners by merely outsourcing prison management. The Su-
preme Court has not squarely addressed this issue 6 3  but
considering its own jurisprudence extending the definition of state
action to include private entities acting under contract with state
governments 4 and the strong parallels between Bivens actions and
§ 1983 claims, it is likely that the Supreme Court would agree. As
further support, many lower federal courts have already held fed-
eral contractors to be government actors within the meaning of
Bivens.65
In West v. Atkins, the Supreme Court held that a private doctor
operating under contract with a state acts under the color of state
law within the meaning of § 1983.66 There, a prisoner brought a
§ 1983 claim against a private doctor who was operating under con-
tract with North Carolina to provide medical services to prisoners in
a state-run prison hospital. The prisoner alleged that the doctor
provided grossly inadequate medical care in violation of his Eighth
Amendment rights.6 7 The Court held that the contractual nature of
62. Pollard v. GEO Grp., Inc., 629 F.3d 843, 854, 858 (9th Cir. 2010).
63. This issue was not reviewed by the Supreme Court in Minneci v. Pollard as the peti-
tioners did not seek the Court's review of the Ninth Circuit's finding of federal action. See
Brief of Petitioners-Appellants at 37 n.8, Minneci v. Pollard, 132 S. Ct. 617 (2012) (No. 10-
1104), 2011 WL 3017399 at *11.
64. See infta note 66 and accompanying text.
65. See Pollard v. GEO Grp., Inc., 629 F.3d 843, 854, 858 (9th Cir. 2010) (concluding
that GEO employees can be considered federal agents acting under color of federal law);
Alba v. Montford, 517 F.3d 1249, 1254 (lth Cir. 2008) (assuming, without deciding, that
officials in privately operated prisons are government actors for purposes of Bivens liability);
Sarro v. Cornell Corrections, Inc., 248 F. Supp. 2d 52, 61 (D.R.I. 2003) (holding that private
prison guards are "federal actors within the meaning of Bivens."). But see Holly v. Scott, 434
F.3d 287, 293 (4th Cir. 2006) (private prison officials operating federal prisons are not fed-
eral actors for the purpose of Bivens liability). Even the GEO Group has conceded, while
defending itself in federal district court, that it operates "under color of federal law" in re-
gard to the confinement of its federal prisoners. See Alvarez v. GEO Grp., Inc., No. SA-09-CV-
0299,2010 WL 743752, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 1, 2010). There, a federal prisoner housed in a
Texas county jail operated by the GEO Group filed a § 1983 action alleging violations of her
Eighth Amendment rights after her fingers were caught in a steel door and severed, as the
result of her guards' abuse. Id. at *1. In its defense, the GEO Group proffered that it "cannot
be sued under section 1983 because it acted under color of federal law rather than under
color of state law as required for a section 1983 claim." Id. at *2.
66. 487 U.S. 42, 54 (1988).
67. Id. at 45.
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the doctor's employment did not absolve the state of liability, rea-
soning that the decision to contract out prison medical care "does
not relieve the State of its constitutional duty"68 to provide adequate
medical care to inmates. Although the state may choose to delegate
its responsibilities to private actors, the court concluded that the
state remains obligated to ensure that adequate care is provided,
and should be found liable if it is not.69 Thus, the court held that
the actions of the private doctor must be considered state action
because he was exercising power "possessed by virtue of state law
and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the
authority of state law."70 After all, in the prison environment, if the
state does not deliver adequate medical care, the prisoner has no-
where else to turn.
7 1
There is no compelling reason for the Supreme Court not to ex-
tend the logic of West v. Atkins to private actors operating under
contract with the federal government. Prison guards working in pri-
vate federal prisons are exercising powers that they possess only by
virtue of their employers' contracts with the federal government.
The government should not be permitted to abrogate its responsi-
bility to protect those for whom it has compelled into its own care
simply by outsourcing the management of its prison facilities. In
sum, considering Supreme Court precedent regarding state action
in prison operations, as well as lower federal court precedent, it is
not unreasonable to consider private federal contractors to be oper-
ating in the shoes of federal government officials and under the
color of federal law.
68. Id. at 56.
69. Id. at 55-56.
70. Id. at 49 (internal citations omitted).
71. Some circuits also have found state action in § 1983 claims against private prison
corporations. For example, the Sixth Circuit has held that a private entity operating a state
corrections facility can be sued under § 1983. Skelton v. Pri-Cor, Inc., 963 F.2d 100 (6th Cir.
1991). The court relied on the fact that the corporation was "performing a public function
traditionally reserved to the state." Id. at 102. The court reasoned that "the power exercised
by [the private prison-management company] is 'possessed by virtue of state law and made
possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.' " Id. (quoting
West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49 (1988)). The Fifth Circuit has similarly held that the "confine-
ment of wrongdoers-though sometimes delegated to private entities-is a fundamentally
governmental function. These corporations and their employees are therefore subject to lim-
itations imposed by the Eighth Amendment." Rosborough v. Mgmt. & Training Corp., 350
F.3d 459, 461 (5th Cir. 2003).
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3. Current Federal Remedies Available to Prisoners
Under current law, the type of prison to which a prisoner is as-
signed dictates the extent to which the prisoner is able to seek
remedies for violations of his constitutional rights. A federal pris-
oner housed in a prison managed by the government is currently
able to bring a Bivens action against individual correctional officers
who violate his constitutional rights.7 2 This federal prisoner, how-
ever, is barred from suing the federal government directly.73
A federal prisoner housed in a privately-run prison, on the other
hand, cannot bring a Bivens action against prison officials because
his claim is against employees of a private company rather than of
the federal government.74 The prisoner is likewise barred from
seeking federal remedies against the prison facility itself.
75
By comparison, state prisoners benefit from more uniform fed-
eral remedies. A state prisoner housed in a publicly-run prison may
seek federal remedies for constitutional violations by an individual
correctional officer under § 1983.76 This prisoner would be unable
to seek federal remedies against the state prison itself.77 Unlike fed-
eral prisoners, however, a state prisoner in a privately-run state
prison may be able to seek federal remedies against private prison
officials 78 and against the private prison itself.79 For ease of refer-
ence, the variations in the federal remedies available based on the
category of prisoners can be charted as follows:
72. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971); see infra Part I1.B.1.
73. FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 484-86 (1994) (declining to extend the Bivens action
in a suit against a federal agency).
74. Minneci v. Pollard, 132 S. Ct. 617 (2012).
75. Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 63, 74 (2001) (prohibiting a Bivens action
against a private federal prison corporation).
76. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
77. This type of action is precluded by the Eleventh Amendment. See Quern v. Jordan,
440 U.S. 332, 345 (1979). However, different principles apply to constitutional violations in
prisons run by municipal or local governments. Unlike the States, municipal governments
can face § 1983 liability resulting from their official policies, customs, or practices. See Monell
v. Dep't. of Social Serv. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978).
78. Rosborough v. Mgmt. & Training Corp., 350 F.3d 459,461 (5th Cir. 2003) (allowing
a § 1983 suit against employees of a private prison corporation).
79. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 941-42 (1982) (allowing a § 1983 suit
against a private corporation acting "under the color of state law").
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TABLE 1. WHEN DOES A PRISONER HAVE A FEDERAL REMEDY
FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATION? 80







This chart depicts the asymmetries in remedies available to differ-
ent types of prisoners. The problem with this asymmetry is
discussed in detail below.
II. THE REMEDY GAP: ASYMMETRIC REMEDIES FOR FEDERAL
PUBLICLY-HELD AND PRIVATELY-HELD PRISONERS
Prisoners may be a marginalized and largely unpopular demo-
graphic, but this does not mean that their constitutional right to be
free from cruel and unusual punishment does not warrant protec-
tion. Yet today, not all federal prisoners benefit from the same
remedies in the face of a constitutional transgression. As a result of
the January 10, 2012 United States Supreme Court decision in Min-
neci v. Pollard,81 an asymmetry now exists between the remedies
available to publicly-held federal prisoners and privately-held fed-
eral prisoners. This asymmetry offends our long-founded notions of
fairness in that an action that offends our federal Constitution must
be protected by a uniform remedy that applies to all those who suf-
fered the infringement at the hands of a federal actor. As the
Supreme Court expressed in Carlson v. Green:
[I] t is obvious that the liability of federal officials for violations
of citizens' constitutional rights should be governed by uni-
form rules. The question whether [the prisoner's] action for
violations by federal officials of federal constitutional rights
80. Peoples v. CCA Det. Ctrs., 422 F.3d 1090 (10th Cir. 2005), vacated in part and aFJd in
part by equally divided court, 449 F.3d 1097 (10th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (per curiam).
81. 132 S. Ct. 617 (2012).
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should be left to the vagaries of the laws of the several States
admits of only a negative answer .... 82
A review of Minneci v. Pollard and the Ninth Circuit decision that
it overturned, which follows, is crucial to understanding the legal
predicament of privately-held federal prisoners and why a uniform
federal reform is needed.
A. The Supreme Court Denies Bivens Action
to Federal Prisoners in Private Prisons
Until recently, there was a circuit split as to whether a prisoner in
a privately-run federal prison could bring a Bivens action against an
individual prison official for an Eighth Amendment violation. In
Pollard v. The GEO Group, Inc.,83 the Ninth Circuit allowed a pri-
vately-held federal prisoner alleging a violation of his Eighth
Amendment right to bring a Bivens action, creating a split with the
Fourth, 84 Tenth,85 and Eleventh Circuits. 6 The Supreme Court re-
solved the circuit split by reversing the Ninth Circuit and denying
an extension of Bivens to all privately-held prisoners. This decision
leaves prisoners like Pollard subject to the inconsistencies of state
tort law and conditions the availability of relief for a violation of a
federal constitutional right to the forum where the prisoner is in-
carcerated. This is problematic because a violation of a federal
constitutional right should be met with a uniform federal remedy.
82. 446 U.S. 14, 23 (1980) (internal citations omitted).
83. 629 F.3d 843 (9th Cir. 2010).
84. Holly v. Scott, 434 F.3d 287 (4th Cir. 2006). Holly, housed in a federal prison oper-
ated by the GEO Group, alleged that the guards provided him with inadequate medical care
in violation of his Eighth Amendment right. The court denied Holly's Bivens action on the
grounds that the GEO Group employees were not government actors who could be held
liable for constitutional violations and that Holly had causes of action only under state tort
law. Id. at 290-95.
85. Peoples v. CCA Det. Ctrs., 422 F.3d 1090 (10th Cir. 2005). Peoples, housed in a
federal prison operated by CCA under contract with the U.S. Marshals Service (USMS), filed
a Bivens action against CCA guards for failure to protect him from repeated physical attacks
by other prisoners. A split panel of the Tenth Circuit held that Peoples could not bring a
Bivens action against the CCA employees because a Kansas negligence tort action was availa-
ble. Id. at 1101.
86. Alba v. Montford, 517 F.3d 1249, 1251 (11th Cir. 2008). Alba, a federal prisoner
housed at a prison operated by CCA under contract with the BOP, alleged that he suffered
from complications after surgery. Alba alleged that he was denied post-operative treatment
because, under CCA policy aimed at cutting costs, the treatment was "elective" and not neces-
sary. Id. at 1251. The district court reasoned that Alba had adequate state court remedies and
denied the Bivens action. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. Id. at 1255.
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A review of Minneci and its application illustrates this deficiency and
the need for remedial legislation.
1. Pollard v. The GEO Group, Inc.
87
In 2002, Richard Lee Pollard, proceeding pro se, filed a Bivens
action seeking relief from abuse he had suffered while housed as an
inmate at the Federal Correctional Institution in Taft, California,
operated by Wackenhut (now the GEO Group).88 While working in
the prison's butcher shop, Pollard slipped on a "haphazardly"
placed cart and fractured both of his elbows.89 Two days later, Pol-
lard was taken to an outside orthopedist for medical treatment.90
The prison guards required that Pollard wear a special restraining
jumpsuit and a "black box" (mechanical restraints around his
wrists) during transport and while at the doctor's office, despite
Pollard's complaints of "excruciating pain" from the jumpsuit and
"severe pain" from the black box restraints.91 The orthopedist
x-rayed Pollard's arms, diagnosed Pollard with fractured elbows,
and recommended that his arms be placed in a bilateral sling and
that he refrain from manual work.9 2 Once back at the prison, the
guards told him that "due to limitations in staffing and facilities,"
he would not be provided with a splint, against doctor's orders.9 3
Pollard was unable to bathe or eat, and he received no medical at-
tention or alternative means to care for himself.9 4 Also against
doctor's orders, prison guards forced Pollard to continue manual
labor.9 5
The district court dismissed Pollard's action against the Wacken-
hut employees for failing to state a colorable Bivens claim. The
court reasoned that he had superior remedies through state tort
law and that the prison officials were not federal actors subject to
Bivens liability.96 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district
87. 629 F.3d 843, 851 (9th Cir. 2010).
88. Pollard v. Wackenhut Corr. Corp., No. CV F 01 6078 OWW, 2006 WL 2661111, at * 1
(E.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2006).
89. Id. at *1.
90. Id.
91. Pollard v. GEO Group, 629 F.3d 843 (9th Cir. 2010).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 851.
95. Id.
96. Pollard v. Wackenhut Corr. Corp., No. CV F 01 6078 OWW, 2006 WL 2661111, at *3,
*4 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2006).
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court's decision and extended Bivens liability to claims against pri-
vate prison guards whose employers were operating under contract
with the federal government.97 The court held that the GEO em-
ployees acted under the color of federal law for purposes of Bivens
liability, state tort remedies were insufficient to foreclose the plain-
tiff s ability to seek Bivens remedies, and there were no "special
factors counseling hesitation" in allowing the Bivens suit to
proceed. 98
2. Minneci v. Pollard
On appeal to the Supreme Court, in an eight-to-one decision re-
versing the Ninth Circuit, the Court held that Bivens does not
extend to prisoners in Pollard's situation because Pollard's claim
"focuses upon a kind of conduct that typically falls within the scope
of traditional state tort law."9 The Court applied the two-part test
established in Wilkie v. Robbins'00 for determining whether to recog-
nize a Bivens remedy: first, the court must determine whether there
are any alternative existing processes for protecting the constitu-
tionally-recognized right at issue; second, the court must consider
whether there are any "special factors counseling hesitation" before
authorizing a new kind of federal litigation.10' In applying this test,
the Court relied primarily on the fact that Pollard, due to his status
as a privately-held prisoner, had the option-not available to pub-
licly-held prisoners-of proceeding under a state tort law claim,
making a Bivens action unnecessary. 10 2 In doing so, the Court distin-
guished Pollard's case from that of the prisoner in Carlson v.
Green'03 (housed in a government-run prison), and concluded that
97. Pollard v. GEO Group, 629 F.3d 843 (9th Cir. 2010).
98. Id. at 868.
99. Minneci v. Pollard, 132 S. Ct. 617, 623 (2012) ("And in the case of a privately em-
ployed defendant, state tort law provides an 'alternative, existing process' capable of
protecting the constitutional interests at stake."). Publicly-held prisoners, on the other hand,
cannot bring state tort law actions against employees of the federal government, because the
Westfall Act substitutes the United States as defendant in common law tort actions against
federal employees. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671, 2679(b)(1) (2006). A number of statutes allow
claims against the federal government, but not for constitutional violations. See infra Part
II.B.2.
100. 551 U.S. 537, 541 (2007).
101. See Minneci, 132 S. Ct. at 623 (citing Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 550).
102. Id (citations omitted) ("Prisoners ordinarily cannot bring state-law tort action
against employees of the federal government. But prisoners ordinarily can bring state-law tort
actions against employees of a private firm.").
103. 446 U.S. 14 (1980) (extending Bivens to prisoners' claims against federal prison offi-
cials for Eighth Amendment violations).
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tort law of the forum state provided an adequate remedy for a pri-
vately-held prisoner.
104
Dissenting, Justice Ginsburg argued that Pollard's Bivens claim
should proceed despite the presence of a state tort law action. 1°5
Justice Ginsburg considered the lack of uniform remedies between
public and private prisoners troubling, and refused to "deny the
same character of relief to ... a prisoner placed by federal contract
in a privately operated prison."'0 6 Rather, she declared that she
"would hold his injuries, sustained while serving a federal sentence,
'compensable according to uniform rules of federal law.' "107 Ap-
plauding Justice Ginsburg's view, this Note argues that it is contrary
to our sense ofjustice and fairness for constitutional violations to be
addressed solely through varying state tort remedies.
B. Deficiencies in the Remedies Currently Available to
Privately-Held Federal Prisoners
Federal prisoners housed in privately-run prisons are disadvan-
taged in terms of available remedies for federal constitutional
violations. In light of Minneci, privately-held federal prisoners can-
not seek federal redress for violations of their federal constitutional
rights through Bivens actions. The seemingly arbitrary decision to
place a prisoner in a private prison effectively strips that prisoner of
the ability to enforce his Eighth Amendment right, which would
otherwise be protected if the prisoner had been assigned to a gov-
ernment-run prison. This Part details how the alternative remedies
that are available to privately-held federal prisoners are inadequate.
1. Forum State Tort Law for Privately-Held Federal
Prisoners Provides Inconsistent and Inadequate Relief
Although publicly-held federal prisoners may pursue Bivens ac-
tions, the Supreme Court's holding in Minneci leaves those in
privately-run prisons to "the 'vagaries' of state tort law."108 State tort
law should not be regarded as a sufficient alternative to Bivens, nor
should it impede the implementation of uniform federal reform,
104. Id.
105. Minneci, 132 S. Ct. at 627 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
106. Id.
107. Id. (citations omitted).
108. Id. at 627 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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because the vindication of a federally-protected right should not be
subject to a state decision on whether to recognize that right.
Violations of constitutional rights cannot be adequately reme-
died by state tort claims. As one federal district court has remarked,
"making the federal remedies available to a federal prisoner at a
privately-operated institution contingent upon whether there are
adequate alternative state law remedies would require a case-by-case
analysis of state law," which "would cause the availability of a Bivens
remedy to vary according to the state in which the institution is lo-
cated, a result that Bivens, itself sought to avoid."109 Rather, in the
face of a federal constitutional violation, it is only fair that such in-
fringement be met with a uniform federal remedy created by the
federal government. 10 It is, in fact, the federal government, rather
than the states, that has traditionally borne the primary responsibil-
ity for protecting individuals' civil rights.111
Furthermore, state tort law is not always capable of providing an
adequate remedy for violations of prisoners' Eighth Amendment
rights.112 Even if state tort law is capable of providing relief, there
remains no clear or consistent application of law. State tort law was
developed to address allegations of harm between private individu-
als, whereas constitutional law addresses the interaction between
private individuals and their government.1 3 This difference in legal
doctrine makes it less likely that state tort law will be able to ade-
quately remedy constitutional violations." 4 Indeed, it is possible
that a constitutional violation would not amount to a tort under the
forum state's laws. For example, denying a prisoner access to a toi-
let for many hours is an Eighth Amendment violation, but does not
necessarily constitute a common law tort.' 5 By the very nature of its
purpose and function, incarceration imposes psychological and
emotional distress that may not necessarily be tied to physical
harm-an element that is generally required by state tort law. Fur-
ther, a prisoner's treatment may amount to an Eighth Amendment
violation as a result of a combination of factors establishing cruel
109. Sarro v. Cornell Corrs. Inc., 248 F. Supp. 2d 52, 63 (D.R.I. 2003).
110. See Carlson v. Green, 46 U.S. 14, 23 (1980) ("[1]t is obvious that the liability of fed-
eral officials for violations of citizens' constitutional rights should be governed by uniform
rules.").
111. See John F. Pries, Alternative State Remedies in Constitutional Torts, 40 CONN. L. Rv.
723, 734 (2008) (discussing the establishment of the Civil War amendments).
112. See id. at 723, 752. Despite the fact that constitutional tort law borrows some princi-
ples from tort law to fill gaps, the actual substance of constitutional tort law is different. Id. at
725.
113. See id. at 749.
114. See id.
115. See id. at 753.
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and inhumane treatment, each of which on its own may not
amount to an actionable tort under state law.116
Admittedly, the circumstances in which a constitutional right is
violated but no tort is committed may be rare. And it must be con-
ceded that constitutional torts require that a plaintiff show that the
defendant acted with "deliberate indifference"'17-a higher burden
than the typical tort law standard of negligence. Even if a state tort
law claim can be established, state tort remedies might not be ade-
quate or consistently applied by and among the states.
In particular, a state might limit tort remedies by placing caps on
damages or prohibiting recovery for emotional distress that is not
connected to a showing of physical harm, thereby providing a plain-
tiff with less generous recovery than he would have been able to
receive under Bivens. For example, California prohibits tort plain-
tiffs from recovering for pre-death pain and suffering and limits
non-economic damages to $250,000." 8 This is just one example of
the variations in state tort law.
Furthermore, state tort law may subject plaintiffs to additional
and burdensome procedural obstacles, such as requiring the plain-
tiff to first use expert administrative panels in medical malpractice
cases"g9-a burden not imposed in Bivens actions. The Supreme
Court conceded as much in Minneci.120 Although these procedural
limitations do not strike at the heart of the plaintiffs claim, they are
nonetheless important barriers to relief, given the limited rights of
a prisoner and the already significant challenges that prisoners face
in bringing their claims.
Finally, leaving the vindication of an Eighth Amendment viola-
tion to the operation of state tort remedies could lead to a race to
the bottom if private entities choose to relocate prisoners to states
with tort laws that are less protective of prisoners' rights.12
1
116. See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304 (1991) ("Some conditions of confinement may
establish an Eighth Amendment violation 'in combination' when each would not do so
alone, but only when they have a mutually enforcing effect that produces the deprivation of a
single, identifiable human need such as food, warmth, or exercise-for example, a low cell
temperature at night combined with a failure to issue blankets."); see also Pollard v. GEO
Group, 629 F.3d 843, 864 (9th Cir. 2010).
117. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976).
118. See CAL. Civ. CODE § 377.34 (West 2004) (limiting Wrongful Death damages to only
damages suffered prior to death); CAL. Crv. ConE § 3333.2 (West 1997) (limiting non-
economic damages in cases of medical negligence to $250,000).
119. Minneci v. Pollard, 132 S. Ct. 617, 625 (2012) (referencing ME. REV. STAT. ANN., tit.
24 § 2853 (Supp. 2010)).
120. Id.
121. This is a possible outcome, considering that private prison corporations can trans-
port prisoners across state lines. See MASON, supra note 41, at 3.
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For all of these reasons, compelling an infringement of a federal
constitutional right to be addressed by varying state remedies of-
fends our deep-rooted principles that a federal constitutional
violation should have an appropriate uniform federal remedy.1 22
2. The Federal Tort Claims Act
The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) is an additional legal rem-
edy available to federal prisoners. Enacted in 1946, long before the
Bivens action was created, the FTCA waived the federal govern-
ment's sovereign immunity and allowed individuals to sue the
government for common law torts.1 23 After the Bivens action was
created in 1971, two important amendments to the FTCA were in-
stituted. First, in 1974, the FrCA was expanded to allow for
individuals to sue the federal government for intentional law en-
forcement torts committed by federal officers, such as assault,
battery, and false imprisonment.12 4 The FTCA, however, did not al-
low the federal government to be substituted as the defendant for
claims sounding in constitutional tort.' 25 From this, it was clear that
Congress did not intend for the FTCA to replace Bivens, but rather
to function as complementary causes of action, retaining the right
of an individual to sue a government official for a constitutional
claim through Bivens.2 6 Second, as further amended in 1988 by the
122. See, e.g., Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946) ("[W]here federally protected rights
have been invaded, it has been the rule from the beginning that courts be will alert to adjust
their remedies so as to grant the necessary relief."). The Bell Court found federal jurisdiction
over plaintiffs' allegations that federal agents violated their Fourth and Fifth Amendment
rights when their homes were unlawfully searched and they were unreasonably detained. The
defendants argued, unsuccessfully, that the plaintiffs stated only a cause of action for tres-
pass, actionable only under state tort law. Id. at 680. The Bell Court laid the initial foundation
for the holding in Bivens.
123. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2006) ("[Tlhe district courts... shall have exclusive jurisdic-
tion of civil actions on claims against the United States, for money damages ... for injury or
loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omis-
sion of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or
employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be
liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission
occurred.").
124. Id. § 2680(h).
125. See Cornelia T. L. Pillard, Taking Fiction Seriously: The Strange Results of Public Officials'
Individual Liability Under Bivens, 88 GEO. LJ. 65, 73 n.39 (1999) ("Constitutional claims...
cannot be brought under the FTCA.").
126. S. Rep. No. 93-588, at 3, S. Rep. No. 588, (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2789
("[Section] 2680(h) thus contemplates that victims of... intentional wrongdoing.., shall
have an action under FTCA against the United States as well as a Bivens action against the
individual officials alleged to have infringed their constitutional rights."). Congressional in-
tent is also evident from Congress's rejection of a Department ofJustice proposal that would
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Westfall Act, 127 the FTCA allows the federal government to be sub-
stituted as defendant for common law torts of its officers acting
within the bounds of their employment 28 Thus, federal govern-
ment officials are virtually immunized from any common law tort
liability, as the Westfall Act mandates that the FICA be the "exclu-
sive" remedy for common law torts.'29 This exclusivity rule,
however, does not apply to claims for constitutional torts, thereby
preserving the Bivens action.130
The FTCA, however, has proven to be a weak channel through
which to vindicate constitutional violations. As the Supreme Court
stated in Carlson v. Green, the FTCA alone "is not a sufficient protec-
tor of the citizens' constitutional rights."' 3 1 Indeed, the FTCA is
inferior to Bivens in several key respects. First, the FTCA does not
provide for punitive damages.132 This can prove important in a case
where prisoners cannot prove significant compensable loss due to
injury, but can show an intentional, malicious violation of their con-
stitutional rights. 33 Second, the FTCA is still subject to variations in
state tort law.' 34 Thus, just as with forum state tort law, the FTCA
remains too varied to provide uniform relief, which is what is re-
quired in the face of a constitutional violation; the opportunity to
vindicate such a transgression must not depend on the state in
which the harm occurred.
have substituted the federal government in as the defendant for constitutional torts. SeeJack
Boger, Mark Gitenstein & Paul R. Verkuil, The Federal Tort Claims Act Intentional Torts Amend-
ment: An Interpretive Analysis, 54 N.C. L. REv. 497, 510-11 (1976) (discussing the Department
of Justice's proposal). The Supreme Court has endorsed the view that the two actions should
proceed together. See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 23 (1980) ("[W]ithout a clear congres-
sional mandate we cannot hold that Congress relegated respondent exclusively to the FTCA
remedy.").
127. Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988 (Westfall
Act), Pub. L. No. 100-694, 102 Stat. 4563 (1988) (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
128. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1) (2006).
129. Id. §2679(b)(2)(B).
130. Id. § 2679(b) (2) (A); see James E. Pfander & David Baltmanis, RethinkingBivens: Legit-
imacy and Constitutional Adjudication, 98 GEO. L.J. 117, 122 (2009).
131. 446 U.S. 14, 23 (1980).
132. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (2006) ("The United States ... shall not be liable for ... punitive
damages."). By contrast, punitive damages may be awarded in a Bivens suit. Carlson, 446 U.S.
at 22. Additionally, punitive damages are available in " 'a proper' " § 1983 claim. Id. at 22.
This lack of punitive damages is significant in that our " 'constitutional design' would be
stood on its head if federal officials did not face at least the same liability as state officials
guilty of the same constitutional transgression." Id. (citing Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478,
504 (1978)).
133. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 257, n.l1 (1978).
134. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1) (2006) (noting that the applicable law will be "in accordance
with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred").
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III. PROPOSED CURATIVE LEGISLATIVE REFORM
Government outsourcing of prison operations is undoubtedly
here to stay. With an expanding prison population and limited re-
sources,135  the federal government simply cannot run all
correctional facilities itself, and a ban on all outsourcing is not a
realistic solution. Hand-in-hand with the trend toward outsourcing,
however, should come statutory reform that would protect the con-
stitutional rights of federal prisoners wherever they may be
incarcerated and create incentives for the federal government to
better police the private facilities where it sends its prisoners.
This Note proposes legislation that would create a uniform statu-
tory remedy available to all federally-incarcerated prisoners. This
reform would be more consistent with the remedies available to
state prisoners under § 1983.136 Considerations of due process and
equal protection require the federal government to protect its fed-
eral prisoners by providing a remedy that is available equally and
uniformly to all prisoners. Significantly, support for this proposal
may be found not only in Justice Ginsburg's dissent in Minneci, but
also in the Supreme Court's reasoning in Carlson v. Green.
137
In this spirit, this Note's proposed reform would create a uni-
form federal remedy and narrow the remedial gap between public
and private federal prisoners by holding the federal government
directly liable for constitutional violations committed by individual
correctional officers employed by either the government or by gov-
ernment contractors. Both are, in effect, acting under the color of
federal law.'38 Moreover, as discussed below, this reform would be
more effective than merely extending Bivens, which has proven to
be an "unfulfilled promise" in important respects. 39 Exact symme-
try between the state and federal governments would not be a
certainty, as differences between the remedies available against the
two levels of government would still apply. Section 1983 provides
both public and private state prisoners with a federal right of action
135. See supra Part I.A.
136. See Robert T. Numbers & Lisa L. Dixon, A Return to "the Heady Days"? The Supreme
Court Addresses Whether the Bivens Doctrine Should Extend to Employees of Government Contractors in
Minneci v. Pollard, 12 ENGAGE, Nov. 2011, at 47, 52 (2011), available at http://www.fed-soc.
org/doclib/20120112..Engagel2.3.pdf ("Ultimately, the only way the asymmetrical liability
issue can be addressed, barring some wholesale change in the law, is if Congress addresses
the issue.").
137. 446 U.S. 14, 23 (1980) (reasoning that the F'CA is not a replacement for the Biven.
action because recovery under the FrCA is contingent on the law of the state in which the
violation occurred and thus is not adequate for a Constitutional violation).
138. See supra Part II.A.
139. See generally Perry M. Rosen, The Bivens Constitutional Tort: An Unfulfilled Promise, 67
N.C. L. REv. 337 (1989) (discussing the limitations and low success rates of Bivens actions).
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against the individual state actor who committed a constitutional
violation, whereas this proposal holds the federal government respon-
sible for all violations proved by federal prisoners. The two forms of
liability, however, adequately parallel one another by bringing the
remedies available to all federal prisoners-in both public and pri-
vate facilities-closer to the level of protection already afforded to
state prisoners under § 1983.
Remedial legislation would provide in substance as follows:
The district courts shall have jurisdiction over actions brought
against the federal government by federally incarcerated per-
sons for violations of the Constitution of the United States, for
injunctive relief or monetary damages, or for injury to person
or death, caused by an employee of the Government or of a
private entity operating with federal authority and under con-
tract with the Government. Any law to the contrary shall be of
no further force or effect.
This model statute would become part of Title 28 of the United
States Code. This proposal would effectively abrogate 28 U.S.C.
§ 2679(b) (2), which currently prohibits FTCA claims based on the
Constitution or federal statutes, 140 and § 2671, which expressly ex-
cludes from liability "any contractor with the United States." 141 This
law would also permit punitive damages.
This proposed statute builds on the FTCA, which allows private
individuals to sue the federal government only for common law
torts and intentional law enforcement torts committed by individu-
als acting on the government's behalf.142 This reform rejects the
FTCA's reliance on Bivens as the sole remedy for a constitutional
tort and instead allows plaintiffs to substitute the federal govern-
ment as the defendant in actions alleging constitutional violations
by government-sponsored officials. There has been support for
such direct governmental liability in the past: the DOJ has proposed
legislation that would substitute the government as the defendant
in a constitutional tort case against government officials, but the
proposal was rejected by Congress.143
140. See also FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 477-78 (1994) (holding that a constitutional
tort does not lie under § 1346(b) of the FTCA). This case would also be overturned by this
legislation.
141. 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (2006).
142. See supra Part II.B.2.
143. See Pfander & Baitmanis, supra note 130, at 135 (noting that in the 1970s the Depart-
ment of Justice proposed to "make an explicit provision for the assertion of constitutional
claims against the government itself"). This proposal arose out of Congressional concern
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This reform places liability directly on the federal government, in
direct contrast to the individual liability model on which prisoners'
Bivens claims are based. In practice, however, this proposal would
not radically depart from Bivens (in terms of increasing government
monetary liability), as the federal government already indemnifies
virtually all of its employees. 144 Bivens imposed liability on the indi-
vidual federal actor under the theory that it would deter those
individuals from committing constitutional violations, as they would
be personally liable for judgments entered against them. 145 In real-
ity, however, there is no clear division between individual and
government liability. 46 Rather, the federal government becomes
the de facto defendant in most Bivens actions, because almost with-
out exception, the government provides the federal official accused
of committing the constitutional violation with legal representation
and pays the cost of either the judgment or settlement of the
claim.
1 47
That federal indemnification is so common in Bivens actions
makes this reform-placing liability directly on the government-a
workable change that in reality will not add substantially to the lia-
bility that the federal government currently accepts. Inasmuch as
private prison officials are supervising federal prisoners by virtue of
the authority vested in them as federal surrogates, the government
is benefiting from their actions. Thus, it is appropriate to hold the
government directly accountable when those actors abuse their
power-and the prisoners under their charge. This rings true par-
ticularly in the context of private prison corporations, where
intentional corporate efforts to cut costs have often resulted in vio-
lations of the standards of care that prison officials should afford
their federal prisoners. 48 These are systemic problems beyond the
control of an individual government employee, and the govern-
ment itself should feel the pressure to improve policies and
procedures of prison corporations if it is going to benefit from out-
sourcing prison management to them. Current statutes, however,
over a number of no-knock drug raids by federal agents on private homes and that the Bivens
action might not be providing enough deterrent. Id. See also supra note 126.
144. Pillard, supra note 125, at 78 ("[S]ettlements or judgments are paid from govern-
ment coffers.").
145. F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 485 (1994) ("It must be remembered that the pur-
pose of Bivens is to deter the officer.") (emphasis added).
146. See Pillard, supra note 125, at 67.
147. Id.
148. See supra Part I.A.
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provide the federal government with immunity from such constitu-
tional tort suits and thus little incentive to institute such reparative
changes.
Given the effects of government indemnification, the further
diminution of government deterrence through the outsourcing of
incarceration, and the asymmetrical remedies afforded federal and
state prisoners, this legislative reform is sorely needed.
IV. REJECTING THE ALTERNATIVE OF EXTENDING
BriVENs AS APPROPRIATE REFORM
In 1971, the Supreme Court used Bivens to fill a remedial gap,
motivated by the fundamental principle of American jurisprudence
that every legal injury should have a legal remedy. 149 From the start,
Bivens was a controversial holding. 50 Until the recent Supreme
Court decision in Minneci, which clamped down on the extension
of Bivens to cover claims against private prison contractors for the
federal government, various commentators argued that Bivens
should be extended to privately-held federal prisoners.15'
An extension of Bivens to cover privately-held federal prisoners,
however, would create a less comprehensive reform than would the
proposed legislation. Over the past four decades, Bivens has been
unsuccessful in plugging the remedial gap-not only in assuring
the right to be free from unconstitutionally harsh treatment wher-
ever incarcerated, but also in serving as a deterrent to jailers who
may abuse prisoners.
52
In practice, plaintiffs rarely prevail on a Bivens claim in court and
thus rarely succeed in reaching advantageous settlements. 53 Unlike
149. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
397 (1971). As Justice Marshall declared in Marbury v. Madison, "[tihe very essence of civil
liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws,
whenever he receives an injury. One of the first duties of government is to afford that protec-
tion." 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803).
150. See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 411-12 (Burger, CJ., dissenting); see also Pfander & Baltmanis,
supra note 130, at 117-18 (discussing scholarly criticism of Bivens).
151. See, e.g., Tikonoff, supra note 13.
152. The Supreme Court has refused to extend Bivens claims in each of the several oppor-
tunities it has had since 1980. See Minneci v. Pollard, 132 S. Ct. 617, 626 (2012); see also
Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412 (1988) (rejecting a Bivens action against a federal agency
for alleged Fifth Amendment due process); F.D.I.C v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471 (1994) (same).
153. Ryan D. Newman, From Bivens to Malesko and Beyond: Implied Constitutional Remedies
and the Separation of Powers, 85 TEx. L. Rsv. 471, 474-75 (2006). Between 1971 and 1985, only
thirty out of more than 12,000 filed Bivens suits resulted in judgments on behalf of plaintiffs;
among these thirty, only four federal defendants actually ended up paying out their judg-
ments. Id. at 475 (citing Rosen, supra note 139, at 343). Although these statistics are dated,
more recent data is unlikely to differ significantly.
SPRING 2013] 1091
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
§ 1983 claims, which are "presumptively available,"'-" the availability
of a Bivens claim is initially subject to the idiosyncrasies of a case-by-
case analysis' 55-a problem in that it introduces an intolerable
"layer of uncertainty into constitutional litigation. "156 A Bivens claim
first must overcome two obstacles that impede its availability to
plaintiffs: the court must determine whether (a) there is any "alter-
native, existing process for protecting the interest [that] amounts
to a convincing reason for the Judicial Branch to refrain from pro-
viding a new and freestanding remedy in damages"; 157 or (b)
whether there are "special factors counseling hesitation before au-
thorizing a new kind of federal litigation." s 58 These two obstacles
were distilled into a two-part test in Wilkie v. Robbins. 59 Thus, even if
Minneci were overruled and Bivens was extended to protect to pri-
vately-held prisoners, it would fail to adequately vindicate these
prisoners' rights.
Bivens claims often fail the first prong, as many courts consider
the availability of state tort claims for privately-held prisoners to
constitute alternative remedies precluding Bivens.160 Indeed, the Su-
preme Court's holding in Wilkie broadened the class of remedies
that may be deemed sufficiently adequate to foreclose a Bivens ac-
tion by stating that Congressional action is not required.' 6' This
means that the success of a Bivens action would vary based on the
state in which the prisoner is housed. As previously discussed, this is
inadequate. 62
The presence of "special factors counseling hesitation" may also
defeat a Bivens claim. The Supreme Court has considered, among
others, four special factors, the presence of which counsel against
extending Bivens: (1) whether it is feasible for the court to create a
154. Pfander & Baltmanis, supra note 130, at 123.
155. Matthew Allen Woodward, License to Violate the Constitution: How the Supreme Court's
Decision in Hui v. Castaneda Exposes the Dangers of Constitutional Immunity and Revives the Debate
over Widespread Constitutional Abuses in Our Immigration Detention Facilities, 32 HAmUNEJ. PUB.
L. & POL'y 449, 464-65 (2011) (citing Pfander & Baltmanis, supra note 130, at 118).
156. Pfander & Baltmanis, supra note 130, at 119.
157. Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 550 (2007).
158. Id. at 550.
159. See Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 541.
160. E.g., Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61 (2001); Holly v. Scott, 434 F.3d 287
(4th Cir. 2006).
161. Isabella Ruth Edmundson, Imprisoned by Liability: Why Bivens Suits Should not be Avail-
able Against Employees of Privately Run Federal Prisons, 45 GA. L. REv. 1127, 1139 (2011) ("ITihe
Wilkie test is significant in that it confirms that the congressional action requirement for
alternative remedies from Carlson has been replaced.").
162. See supra Part II.B.1.
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workable cause of action; 63 (2) whether extending such a cause of
action would undercut Bivens's deterrence goals; 164 (3) whether the
cause of action would impose asymmetric liability costs on privately-
run facilities in comparison to government-run facilities; 65 and (4)
whether there are any unique attributes that create a reason to in-
fer that congressional inaction is deliberate and should not be
altered.166 This test gives federal judges wide latitude in deciding
whether to find the presence of such special factors, leaving the
availability of the prisoner's remedies to the misfortune of appear-
ing before a judge who may be less inclined to take a broad view of
Bivens. For example, in Holly v. Scott, the Fourth Circuit relied on
these special factors to dismiss the prisoner's claims that inadequate
medical care violated his Eighth Amendment right. 67 The fact that
the "defendants [were] private individuals, not government actors,"
that the plaintiff had an "adequate remedy against the defendants"
for his alleged injuries through a state tort negligence suit, and that
the "defendants were private individuals employed by a 'wholly pri-
vate corporation' was fatal to a Bivens claim."168
Ultimately, although Bivens provides federal prisoners in govern-
ment-run prisons with a remedy, its success for privately-held
federal prisoners would be thwarted by its fundamental weaknesses.
It is also much more limited than the remedies afforded to state
prisoners under § 1983. Whichever way they turn, privately-held
federal prisoners are left with deficient remedies. An all-encompass-
ing statutory approach is needed to protect the constitutional rights
of federal prisoners, both public and private. Meaningful reform in
this context must thus involve a reevaluation of who is ultimately
responsible for the care of all federal prisoners.
V. IMPLICATIONS OF THIS REFORM
Because this Note advocates for society's unpopular prison popu-
lation by affording them with greater protections, prompt
Congressional action is doubtful. Nonetheless, the problem of pris-
oner abuse remains. In light of Minneci, reform is needed not only
to guarantee the constitutional rights of all federal inmates but also
163. See Pollard v. GEO Group, 629 F.3d 843, 863 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted)




167. Holly v. Scott, 434 F.3d 287 (4th Cir. 2006).
168. Edmundson, supra note 161, at 1142.
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to compel more proactive oversight of the government's prison
contractors.16
9
By holding the federal government directly accountable, this leg-
islative proposal compels deterrence-a prominent feature of
Bivens itself-on the federal government. Faced with potential lia-
bility, the federal government would ideally be more forceful in
ensuring that its contracts with prison corporations contain clauses
specifying appropriate standards for training, treatment and care of
prisoners. This would hopefully compel the government to enforce
these contractual provisions in an effort to enhance monitoring
and training of private prison employees, establish performance
benchmarks for contractors, oversee or take over failing prison fa-
cilities, and promote whistleblower protection for those reporting
sub-standard conditions or constitutional violations. Without such
an incentive, the federal government is likely to continue to shop
for the lowest bidder without regard for its treatment of
prisoners.17
0
Some commentators have voiced concerns that federal district
courts are already inundated with prisoners' civil rights petitions.
171
This should not, however, discourage needed reform. Extending li-
ability for wrongful actions in private prison facilities would not
open the floodgates to prisoner litigation in federal courts. The
most recent government data shows that the increase in the num-
ber of prisoner civil rights actions from 1980 to 2000 resulted from
the increase in the prison population, not an increase in the rate of
prisoner litigation.172 Moreover, the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act
(PLRA), passed in 1996,173 would require all inmates to exhaust
169. By contrast, in the case of CCA's egregious management of its prison facility in
Youngstown, Ohio, the government became involved only after the grave prisoner mistreat-
ment occurred, and its involvement was limited to requiring CCA to conduct an internal
investigation. See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
170. A recent state example shows that liability can be appropriately spread throughout
the chain of responsibility. GEO, which operates three of New Mexico's four private prisons,
was required by contract to pay New Mexico a $1.1 million settlement over several months for
failing to adequately staff its correctional facilities with the proper ratio of guards per pris-
oner. Per the agreement, GEO is also required to spend $200,000 over the next year on
efforts to recruit new correctional officers for one of the private prison facilities. The settle-
ment was made possible because the contract between GEO and the State allowed New
Mexico to penalize GEO when staffing vacancies at its facilities surpass 10 percent for more
than thirty consecutive days. See Trip Jennings, State Fines Private P-ison Operator $1.1 Million
Over Staffing Shortage, TiH NEw MEXICAN (Nov. 14, 2011), http://wwwsantafenewmexican.
com/Local%20News/State-fines-private-prison-operator-1-1-million-over-staffing-.
171. See, e.g., Pfander & Baltmanis, supra note 130.
172. JoHN ScAL.A, BuREAU OF Jus-IcE STATrSrIcs, PRIsoNER PETITroNs FnW IN U.S. Dis-
TraCT CouRTs, 2000, wrri TRFNDs 1980-2000, at 7 (2002).
173. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) ("No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions
under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail,
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their administrative remedies before filing actions in federal
court. 174 Prisoners' failure to exhaust all legal remedies provides an
affirmative defense barring their claims.175 In fact, between the
years 1995 (the year before the enactment of the PLRA) and 2000,
the number of civil rights petitions filed per 1,000 inmates fell from
thirty-seven to nineteen.
76
Extending claims to private prisoners would likely have only a
nominal effect on the federal docket. Federal prisoners account for
approximately 1,600 Bivens cases per year. 177 Since privately-held
prisoners account for 16.4 percent of the federal prisoner popula-
tion,'178 this correlates to only about 260 Bivens cases. Of these 260
cases, many would wind up in federal court through diversity or
removal jurisdiction.179 Consequently, there is no basis to believe
that the proposed reform would have grave consequences for the
federal court docket.
CONCLUSION
The increase in privatization of governmental functions has re-
sulted in many federal prisoners being housed in private prison
facilities operated under contract with the federal government. As a
result of this outsourcing, these prisoners have lost the ability to
effectively vindicate their Eighth Amendment right to be free from
cruel and unusual punishment.
To help ensure that privately-held federal prisoners are not
stripped of their constitutional rights simply by virtue of where they
are incarcerated, this Note proposes legislation that would hold the
prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are
exhausted."). The PLRA applies to prisoners in both state and federal prisons, whether pub-
lic or private. See Ross v. County of Bernalillo, 365 F.3d 1181, 1184 (4th Cir. 2004); Lavista v.
Beeler, 195 F.3d 254, 256 (6th Cir. 1999).
174. For example, one such administrative remedy by which the prisoner first must pro-
ceed is the BOP's Administrative Remedy Program. 28 C.F.R. § 542.13 (2012) ("[Ain inmate
shall first present an issue of concern informally to staff, and staff shall attempt to informally
resolve the issue before an inmate submits a Request for Administrative Remedy. Each War-
den shall establish procedures to allow for the informal resolution of inmate complaints.").
175. SeeJones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007).
176. JOHN SCALiA, BuREAu or JustcE STAnSnCS, PRISONER PETITONS Fu_.E IN U.S. Dis
TrICT COURTS, 2000, wrrH TRENDs 1980-2000 (2002), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/
content/pub/pdf/ppfusd00.pdf.
177. Brief for Respondent Richard Lee Pollard at 48, Minneci v. Pollard, 132 S. Ct. 617
(2012) (No. 10-1104), 2011 WL 4100439, at *48.
178. See WIsr, SABOL & GREENMAN, supra note 24.
179. Id.
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federal government responsible for the treatment of all its prison-
ers, no matter where they are housed. This would also create
greater symmetry between the remedies afforded federal prisoners
in government-run prisons and the remedies currently available to
state prisoners under § 1983. Such legislative reform will hopefully
have its greatest impact in correcting prison wrongs before they oc-
cur, by encouraging the federal government to engage in more
effective oversight of all federal prisons, whether public or private,
and to provide better protection to all federal prisoners.
